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INTRODUCTION
For almost two decades, an embarrassing pattern of forum shop-
ping has been developing in the highly visible world of big-case bank-
ruptcy reorganization.' Forum shopping-defined here as the act of
filing in a court that does not serve the geographical area of the
debtor's corporate headquarters-now occurs in more than half of all
big-case bankruptcies.
Two jurisdictions have attracted most of the forum shoppers.
During the 1980s, when a large portion of the shopping was to New
York, the lawyers involved asserted that New York was a natural venue
because of its role as the country's financial capital and because so
many of the companies, creditors, and professionals involved had
their offices there. In the early 1990s, however, when the favored des-
tination shifted abruptly from New York to Delaware, these explana-
tions wore thin. Delaware was then a sleepy, backwater bankruptcy
district virtually devoid of bankruptcy professionals or corporate
headquarters.
1 LoPucki and Whitford first reported the pattern in 1991. See Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 11.
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In response to widespread concern 2 and the "troubling specter of
courts competing for big-case bankruptcy business," the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended in the fall of 19973
that Congress amend the bankruptcy venue statute to prevent forum
shoppers from filing in Delaware. 4 One influential participant in the
Commission's deliberations crystallized the sentiment for change, stat-
ing that "the effort to find debtor-friendly courts . .. demeaned the
entire system by suggesting that bankruptcy courts were for sale."5
While the Commission deliberated, the Delaware federal court re-
acted by shifting the assignment of cases from the bankruptcy court to
the district court. 6
This Article reports the results of a comprehensive study of big-
case bankruptcy forum shopping from 1980 to 1997. A description of
what has occurred helps explain both the causes of Delaware's rise as
the preferred Chapter 11 forum and why embarrassment forced the
system to take extraordinary countermeasures. The temporal coinci-
dence of three major changes in Chapter 11 practice obscures those
causes: (1) a nationwide increase in the rate of Chapter 11 forum
shopping; (2) a national trend toward faster case-processing times;
and (3) the rise of "prepackaged" bankruptcy cases in which the nec-
essary majorities of creditors have accepted the reorganization plan
before the debtor files the case. Two prior studies partly illuminate
the phenomenon of big-case bankruptcy forum shopping,7 but each
analyzes fewer years of data and accounts for fewer variables than this
study.
This Article casts doubt on the two common explanations for fo-
rum shoppers' attraction to Delaware: (1) that Delaware resolves
bankruptcy cases more quickly, and (2) that Delaware has developed
2 Although written reports on the subject are scarce, there is an undercurrent of
complaints that lawyers and judges in the headquarters districts are losing the fees and
visibility that accompany these large cases. See, e.g., Kathryn R. Heidt, Business Bankruptcy
Committee, Business Law Section, American Bar Association, Report on Bankruptcy Venue
22 (Oct. 15, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
3 NATIONAL BANRa RmE-vEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY THE NEXT T-wrv YEARS 778-79
(1997) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
4 The Commission Report denies that the recommendation is directed against Dela-
ware. See id. at 779.
5 Minutes of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Meeting 13 (Feb. 23-24,
1996) [hereinafter Commission Minutes] (statement of Gerald Munitz), reprinted in Dela-
ware State Bar Ass'n, Report of the Delaware State Bar Association to the National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission in Support of Maintaining Existing Venue Choices
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Delaware Bar Report].
6 See infra text accompanying note 55.
7 See GORDON BERmANT ET AL., CHAPTER 11 VENUE CHOICE BlY LARGE PUBLIC COMPA-
NIEs: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
BANKRUPTCY SYsTEM (1997) (discussing filings in 1994 and 1995); LoPucki & Whitford,
supra note 1 (discussing filings and confirmations from 1979 to 1988).
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expertise in prepackaged cases.8 No statistically significant evidence
exists that Delaware processes large Chapter 11 cases more quickly
than other districts. The faster processing time that Gordon Bermant
reported for Delaware, and thus Delaware's seeming comparative effi-
ciency in resolving bankruptcy cases, is almost entirely a consequence
of Delaware having a larger proportion of prepackaged cases than
other districts.9 Moreover, Delaware does not process prepackaged
cases significantly faster than other districts. We do find statistically
significant evidence that New York processes cases slower than other
bankruptcy courts. These findings cast further doubt on the argu-
ment that forum shopping targets the most efficient court.
Forum-shopping debtors must believe that the benefits of filing
in Delaware outweigh the costs. The Delaware Bankruptcy Court re-
quires that local counsel represent each party, adding an expense that
the debtor usually would not incur when filing elsewhere. Because
debtors who file in Delaware also incur travel expenses for nonlocal
professionals and company personnel, the direct costs of forum shop-
ping to Delaware are not trivial. Forum-shopping debtors must be-
lieve that the benefits of filing in Delaware are substantial.
The Chapter 11 forum-shopping phenomenon thus requires
deeper analysis. The fact that the pattern of forum shopping abruptly
shifted from New York to Delaware suggests that the forces that drive
forum shopping transcend Delaware's unproven efficiency. Evidence
that debtors disproportionately shop out of certain districts suggests
that there is a push as well as a pull to forum shopping. When debtors
shop to escape their home fora, the particular destination may be of
lesser importance.
Delaware's replacement of New York in 1990 as the forum shop-
per's destination of choice makes sense only in light of the political
context in which it occurred. Changes in New York's judge-assign-
ment mechanisms and a bankruptcy venue decision in Delaware, 10 in
combination with Delaware's recognized tradition of providing pro-
corporate legal structures," may have triggered this shift to Delaware.
8 See, e.g., David A. Skeel,Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on
Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REv. 1, 20 (1998) ("Rather than lengthy cases, Delaware is known for its
speedy confirmation of reorganization plans."); id. at 27 ("Delaware's judges also tend to
confirm traditional Chapter 11 cases much more quickly than judges in other districts.
Venue shopping in bankruptcy has thus produced a clientele effect, with Delaware at-
tracting firms that seek to reorganize quickly."); id. at 28 (stating that "Delaware has suc-
cessfully addressed the single biggest problem with Chapter 11 in recent years-the
inordinate time and expense of the reorganization process").
9 See BERMANT ET AL., supra note 7, at 39.
10 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REv. 469, 471 (1987) (noting that Delaware has "a domi-
nant position in the market for corporate charters").
970 [Vol. 84:967
SHOPPING FOR JUDGES
Once Delaware gained a reputation as a shopping destination, this
reputation probably persisted in part because the state had become a
safe choice for bankruptcy lawyers and their clients. Nevertheless, for
venue choice to become an issue, there first must exist some dissatis-
faction with the home court.
Part I of this Article explains why the legal system regards big-case
bankruptcy forum shopping as embarrassing while it tolerates and
even encourages other kinds of forum shopping. Part II describes the
data and methodology of the study. Part III discusses the pattern of
big-case forum shopping, its recent increase in frequency, and its rela-
tion to the increasing number of prepackaged cases. Part IV seeks to
explain the pattern of forum shopping.
I
WHY FORUM SHOPPING IN CHAPTER 11 CASES EMBARRASSES
THE SYSTEM
Though the term "forum shopping" has a pejorative connota-
tion, 12 forum shopping is far from universally condemned. In fact,
legislative bodies often provide a plaintiff with a choice of two or more
fora, permitting it to file a case in the state or federal court where the
cause of action accrued, at the plaintiff's location, or at the defen-
dant's location.' 3 One type of forum shopping, however, has received
uniform condemnation and likely will lead to disciplinary proceedings
against the attorney involved-shopping forjudges.14 Observers seem
to agree that judge shopping "breeds disrespect for and threatens the
integrity of our judicial system"' 5 and undermines the aphorism that
"ours is a government of laws, not men."
12 See, e.g., George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn't a Conserva-
tive Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 649, 666-68 (1993) (describing "anti-forum-
shopping" as "the classical position"); Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and
Internationa, 63 TUL. L. REv. 553, 553 (1989) ("As a rule, counsel, judges, and academi-
cians employ the term 'forum shopping' to reproach a litigant who, in their opinion, un-
fairly exploits jurisdictional or venue rules to affect the outcome of a lawsuit."); Note,
Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1677 (1990) (arguing "that forum
shopping is disfavored because it reveals an element of manipulability in the legal system
that challenges the ideal of law as the embodiment of impartial justice or fairness").
13 Bankruptcy law also gives filers a broad choice of venues. See infra note 19.
14 See, e.g., No Judge Shopping Allowed, NAT'L LJ., May 5, 1997, at A8 (attorney paid
sanctions of $7,500 for filing 13 lawsuits, then withdrawing all but one in a case involving
Dr. Jack Kevorkian); Randall Samborn, Chicago Judge Sanctions Firm, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 18,
1994, at A4 (reporting that ajudge sanctioned Mayer, Brown & Platt lawyers for filing five
identical complaints in an attempt to draw one of three judges).
15 In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1997) (upholding sanctions despite the fact
that thejudge-shopping scheme involved no deceit and violated no rule). In a related and
similarly regarded kind of forum shopping, a party files a case in a second court that is not
an appeal from the first court but is nevertheless an effort to override the first court's
decision. See, e.g., Y.J. Sons & Co. v. Anemone, Inc. (In reYJ. Sons & Co.), 212 B.R. 793,
1999]
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The principal means of preventing judge shopping within the
same judicial panel is random case assignment. Shopping among the
judges of different courts is more difficult to control, but holds less
potential for embarrassment because the reason for inter-court shop-
ping is ambiguous. The system's defenders plausibly can assert that
the pattern of case filing observed demonstrates not judge shopping,
but merely shopping for convenience, juries, or law.
These benign explanations, however, are not always available.
Convenience cannot explain the forum shopping that this Article ex-
plores because this shopping has focused successively on two courts,
New York and Delaware, neither of which is convenient to the filers.
Nor can a search for friendly juries explain Chapter 11 forum shop-
ping. Juries play no significant role in bankruptcy cases. Differences
in law and procedure cannot drive the shopping because the gov-
erning law and procedure are federal. 16 Theoretically, every signifi-
cant aspect of Chapter 11 reorganization is uniform throughout the
United States. 17 Significant, persistent differences among bankruptcy
courts that would make forum shopping the norm should be impossi-
ble.18 Contrary to these implausible explanations, the persistence of
forum shopping demonstrates the importance of judges to litigants
and, implicitly, the relative unimportance of law.
This discussion does not imply that bankruptcy judges are less
likely to "follow the law" than other judges. Rather, it is easier to
demonstrate in the context of bankruptcy that the principal purpose
808 (D.NJ. 1997) (upholding sanctions for "forum shopping" against an attorney who
filed a bankruptcy case following a state court decision on the same transaction).
16 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
17 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code contains most of the substantive law. See id. The Fed-
eral Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure govern Bankruptcy Court procedure. These rules per-
mit districts to make local bankruptcy rules. See FED. R. BANxR. P. 9029. The local rules,
however, must remain consistent with the federal rules and cannot prohibit or limit the use
of an extensive set of Federal Official Forms. See id. In addition, "[a] local rule imposing a
requirement of form shall not be enforced in a manner that causes a party to lose rights
because of a nonwillful failure to comply with the requirement." Id. Local rules generally
deal with matters such as admission to practice before the court, the necessary numbers of
copies of documents, or the permissible types of transmissions when filing papers.
18 In his defense of Delaware bankruptcy venue, Professor Skeel argues that bank-
ruptcy law permits local variation. See Skeel, supra note 8, at 25. But his examples fail to
make his case. His reference to differences in "approaches to hearings or first day orders,"
id., specifies no legal basis for these differences. His substantive law examples of "the
breadth of the preference provisions" and "whether secured creditors have a security inter-
est in rents," id., ignore that (1) even though Delaware law might differ from the law of
other states on these points, they are points on which Delaware conflicts rules likely would
specify the application of the same law that the conflicts rules of other states would specify,
and (2) there has been no suggestion that either of these state-to-state differences has ever
prompted anyone to file a bankruptcy case in Delaware. Skeel's examples of approving
postpetition financing or granting extensions of exclusivity, see id., involve the interpreta-
don and application of specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The Delaware bank-
ruptcy court would be required to follow federal law on these matters.
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of forum shopping is to obtain or avoid the assignment of particular
judges than it is to demonstrate the same in other contexts. The busi-
ness of the bankruptcy courts is narrow and repetitive, allowing strate-
gically minded lawyers to compare more easily the decisions and
practices of one judge with those of another. When these lawyers ex-
press their preferences through forum shopping, they create the pat-
tern that this Article documents. 19 Strategically minded lawyers would
have more difficulty discovering and comparing the views of judges
who sit on courts of general jurisdiction and confront a much wider
range of issues. These lawyers therefore would be less likely to have
the knowledge base necessary to shop for nonbankruptcy judges in
different jurisdictions.
II
METHODOLOGY
Documenting and explaining the pattern of forum shopping re-
quires systemic data collection. This Part describes the case selection
process, the data sources, and the protocols that assured comparable
data across cases.
A. Case Selection
This study includes all Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases20 in the
19 Bankruptcy courts are specialized, yet they have a volume of cases more than four
times that of the district courts. Thus, at any given time, highly similar cases are proceed-
ing in different bankruptcy courts, inviting comparison. Beginning with studies in the
1920s by then Yale Law Professor William 0. Douglas, empirically minded legal scholars
have made comparisons on numerous occasions, time and again sho.wing wide differences
in outcomes from court to court and judge to judge. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and
Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 Am. BAiNc,. L.J. 501 (1993); LoPucki &
Whitford, supra note 1, at 34-38; Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Cul-
ture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
801, 841-47 (1994).
Highly permissive bankruptcy venue rules also contribute to the current difficulties.
They permit the filer to choose among (1) the debtor's domicile or residence, which for a
corporation is its jurisdiction of incorporation; (2) the debtor's principal place of business;
(3) the location of the debtor's principal assets in the United States; or (4) any court in
which a bankruptcy case is pending against the debtor's affiliate, general partner, or part-
nership. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (1994).
20 Large, public companies are almost invariably corporate groups that include sev-
eral entities under common ownership. Rarely do all of the companies in a corporate
group file bankruptcy. This study includes every case of sufficient size in which at least one
10-K filing entity filed bankruptcy in a bankruptcy court in the United States.
If the bankruptcy cases of several members of a corporate group were pending before
the same court at the same time, and the cases resulted in the confirmation of a single plan
of reorganization, the cases together constitute one case for the purposes of this study.
Ordinarily, this occurred only when the cases were consolidated, administratively or
substantively.
1999]
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United States by or against companies 21 that were, at the time of fil-
ing, publicly held 22 with assets worth at least $100 million 23 in 1980
dollars.24 This study limits the universe to public companies because
of the difficulty in obtaining information about private companies. It
limits the universe to companies with assets of $100 million or more in
1980 dollars for three reasons. First, the dynamics of large and small
21 This study uses financial data for the entire corporate group, even in cases in which
only part of the group filed for bankruptcy. It does so in part because public companies
almost invariably disclose financial information only for groups, not for each entity within
a group. Use of the group data, however, is probably appropriate for most purposes.
When subsidiaries fall to follow their parents into bankruptcy, it is often only because cred-
itors are not pushing them.
22 The standard for determining whether a company is public or private for the pur-
poses of this study is whether the company is within the category of firms required to file a
Form 10-Kwith the SEC. Generally speaking, firms must file 10-Ks-annual reports pursu-
ant to sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a
(1994)-if they have (1) securities listed on a national securities exchange, (2) securities
registered under section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, or (3) a registration statement that
has become effective under the Securities Act of 1933.
Information on 10-Ks comes from LEXIS (source: SEC Form 10-K). If the company
filed 10-Ks for its fiscal years ending immediately prior and immediately subsequent to its
bankruptcy filing, this study categorizes it as a public company. If the company did not
appear in the LEXIS database (which includes EDGAR) and the case was not on the SEC's
"Public Companies" list of bankruptcy filings, we excluded the case from our study. If the
company made some filings with the SEC, but did not file 10-Ks for both the year before
and the year after filing bankruptcy, we investigated the circumstances. This study includes
those companies that had not filed 10-Ks after filing bankruptcy because they were liqui-
dated in the bankruptcy case and those companies that did not file 10-Ks after filing bank-
ruptcy because they went private after filing. This study excludes companies that did not
file 10-Ks because they went private shortly before the filing of the bankruptcy case, even if
they continued to make filings other than 10-K filings after going private. It further ex-
cludes those companies that did not file a 10-K for the three years prior to bankruptcy and
did not file a 10-K during bankruptcy.
One effect of this criteria was to exclude from the study most filings in the United
States by public companies based outside the United States. Unless those companies sell
securities in the United States, they need not file 10-Ks.
23 This study includes a company if its assets reached this benchmark according to
either of two sources: (1) the schedules that the debtor filed in the bankruptcy case, or (2)
the last 10-K that the company filed prior to bankruptcy, provided it was for a year ending
within the year prior to bankruptcy. This study determines the assets scheduled in the
bankruptcy case from several sources. First, in the absence of conflicting information, we
accepted the amount on the SEC Public Companies list as correctly reflecting the sched-
ules. For the few cases for which the SEC listed two different numbers, we used the latter
of the two. Second, we accepted accounts of the assets at filing that reputable news publi-
cations reported. Third, in a few cases we consulted the schedules that the debtor had
filed with the court. Regardless of the source, we sought to discover the total scheduled
assets of all entities that were part of the corporate group.
24 To adjust dollar amounts to a common scale, 1980 dollars, we used the Consumer
Price Index-All Urban Consumers, base period 1982-84. See Consumer Price Indexes (last
modified Mar. 18, 1999) <http://stats.bls.gov/cpihome.htm>. Based on that source, com-
panies with assets equal to or in excess of $100 million in 1980 and approximately $190
million in 1996 qualified for inclusion. Of course, the cutoff amount falls between these
two numbers for years between 1980 and 1996.
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reorganization cases differ sufficiently to require separate study.25 It is
unlikely that small firms can shop to New York or Delaware courts as
easily or as frequently as large firms. Second, limiting the study to
large cases assures a universe of manageable size. Finally, each large
case is itself of considerable economic significance.
B. Variable Definitions and Data Sources
This study gathered data from several sources. To insure compa-
rable data across cases, the study employed a set of protocols describ-
ing acceptable data sources and defining the data that the study would
collect.26
1. Defining Forum Shopping
The key variable studied is forum shopping. We define a "forum
shop" or "shop" as the filing of a case in a court other than that which
serves the location of the debtor's chief executive office.27 We con-
sider filings in non-chief executive office cities to be "shops" because
that venue is less convenient for the debtors' executives than the city
containing the chief executive office. 28
Theoretically, one might define forum shopping with reference
to the debtor's place of incorporation or to the location of its princi-
pal assets or operations, rather than only the location of its chief exec-
utive office.29 The debtor's place of incorporation, however, has no
commercial significance. 0 Determining the location of the debtor's
25 For a comparative discussion of large and small reorganization cases, see Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 729, 749-56. The National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission since has recommended that Congress reinstate separate proce-
dures for large and small cases. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 25-32 (Small
Business Proposals).
26 In nearly all instances,,research assistants gathered the data, photocopied the origi-
nal source, and entered the data. In all instances, however, one of us checked the entry
against the original source for accuracy and decided whether the source was acceptable.
As we encountered ambiguities, we revised the protocols and, when necessary, rechecked
the prior entries to ensure that they complied with the revised protocols.
27 Bankruptcy cases may commence in the district of the debtor's "domicile, resi-
dence, principal place of business... or principal assets," or the district "in which there is
pending a case under [the Bankruptcy Code] concerning such person's affiliate." 28
U.S.C. § 1408 (1994).
28 See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 8, at 36 (stating that "the managers of a firm have a
significant incentive to avoid venues that are inconvenient to the firm's headquarters").
29 See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (listing possible filing locations).
30 The persons, organizations, and interests that bear the effects of the reorganization
have no greater tendency to be located in a place simply because it is the place of incorpo-
ration. The state of incorporation for the purpose of this study is the state listed on a
company's Form 10-K for the period ending closest to the date of the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition. This study determined the states of incorporation for other members of
the corporate group from an exhibit to the company's 10-K filings or annual reports. It
considered a company to be a member of the group for this purpose only if the parent
owned at least 50% of the outstanding voting stock. It assumed that the parent owned at
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principal assets or operations requires both artificial definitions and
data not readily available for most public companies. Further, exclud-
ing filings at the location of the debtor's principal assets or operations
from the definition of forum shopping likely made little difference.
Filings rarely occurred in a city in which the debtor had its principal
assets or operations but not its headquarters. 31
2. Measuring Case-Processing Time
To measure case-processing time, we use the time between the
bankruptcy filing and the entry of an order confirming the plan or
otherwise disposing of the case.32 To investigate other scholars' asser-
tions that faster processing time is the primary factor explaining fo-
rum shoppers' attraction to Delaware, one must account for
important pre-filing differences between Delaware and non-Delaware
filings that affect case-processing time regardless of forum. The prin-
cipal difference that affects case-processing time is "prepackaging." In
a prepackaged case, the debtor proposes the plan and obtains the
agreement of creditors before filing the reorganization case.33 Cases
with prepackaged plans, on average, proceed to confirmation more
quickly34 and more surely35 than other cases. In accord with general
usage, we consider a plan "prepackaged" if prior to filing the petition,
the debtor drafted the plan and disclosure statement, distributed
them to impaired classes of creditors, and won their acceptance by the
majorities necessary for confirmation.3 6 Unless the court found some
fault with the voting thus conducted, no negotiation or voting was
necessary during the Chapter 11 case.3 7 The court could proceed di-
rectly to considering the plan for confirmation.
Some debtors negotiated the terms of their plan with key credi-
tors or their representatives prior to bankruptcy, but did not solicit
usable votes prior to filing or did not solicit them from all impaired
least 50% if the company appeared in the list of subsidiaries and the list did not contain
information to the contrary.
31 Most forum shoppers filed in New York or Delaware; debtors rarely had substantial
operations in either jurisdiction. See infra Part III.A.
32 The filing dates came from a variety of sources including newspapers, bankruptcy
services, SEC filings, reported opinions, and court dockets on PACER. Generally, we con-
firmed the dates by more than one source. If members of the corporate group filed on
different days, but the filings were later consolidated, this study used the date of the first
filing.
33 See Delaware Bar Report, supra note 5, at 18 n.39.
34 See infra Table 1.
35 None of the 41 prepackaged cases in the study resulted in dismissal or conversion
to Chapter 7; nine of the 224 nonprepackaged cases for which disposition is known (4%)
were dismissed or converted to Chapter 7.
36 See, e.g., Delaware Bar Report, supra note 5, at 18 n.39.
37 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1994) (providing for the use of votes properly solicited
prior to the filing of the Chapter 11 case).
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creditor classes. In accord with the general usage of the term, we con-
sider these plans "prenegotiated" rather than prepackaged. 38 Proba-
bly for public relations purposes, the debtors who filed these plans
sometimes characterized them as "prepackaged" to suggest that the
cases would proceed quickly or that obtaining the remaining votes
constituted a mere technicality.
In the absence of a claim by the debtor, at or prior to filing, that
key creditors already had agreed to the terms of a specific plan, we
considered the plan "unnegotiated." Of course, the parties negoti-
ated plans after the filing of the petition in many of these "unnego-
iated" cases.
3. Categorizing Case Outcomes
To explore whether forum affects case outcomes, this study di-
vides case outcomes into five categories: (1) "confirmed" if the court
confirmed a plan; (2) "dismissed" if the court dismissed the case with-
out confirmation of a plan; (3) "converted" if the court converted to
Chapter 7 for liquidation without confirming a plan; (4) "§ 363 sale"
if the debtor sold all or substantially all of the assets during the Chap-
ter 11 case without the prior confirmation of a plan; and (5) "pend-
ing" if the court did not confirm any plan and the case remained
under Chapter 11 as of August 27, 1998. Courts may have dismissed
or converted a case, or even confirmed a plan, after the sale of all or
substantially all of the debtor's assets. Any post-sale dispositions of
those cases, however, were of little consequence and we ignored them.
III
DESCRIBING TRENDS IN FORUM SHOPPING, CHAPTER 11 CASE-
PROCESSING Tnvms, AND PREPACKAGED CASES
No precise description exists of the pattern of forum shopping in
big bankruptcy reorganizations. This Article supplies that description
and then suggests why the description undermines conventional ex-
planations for Delaware's popularity.
A. The Level and Time Trend of Forum Shopping
By any reasonable measure, the rate at which large corporations
fie Chapter 11 cases at locations distant from their headquarters is
high. One hundred twenty-two of the 284 cases studied (43.0%) were
fied in a court located in ajurisdiction different from the jurisdiction
where the company maintained its chief executive office at the time of
filing.
38 See Delaware Bar Report, supra note 5, at 18 n.39.
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Forum shopping is not only prevalent, it has been increasing.
Figure 1 shows the rate of forum shopping from 1980 to 1997. The
center of each circle indicates the rate of forum shopping for the year;
the area of each circle indicates the relative number of filings in that
year.3 9
FIGuRE 1
RATE OF FORUM SHOPPING OF LARGE CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATION CASES BY YEAR: 1980-1997
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NOTE: The center of each circle indicates the rate of forum shopping for the year; the area
of each circle indicates the relative number of filings in the year.
The already low rate of forum shopping declined from 1980 to
1984. The rate jumped in 1985 to about 40% of large Chapter 11
fillings and remained at that level through 1993, despite large changes
in the number of filings from year to year. From 1994 to 1996, the
rate climbed sharply to 86%. The rate fell in 1997, but remains at
historically high levels. Forum shopping in large cases has reached
the point at which it is the rule rather than the exception.
Strong geographical tendencies exist. Figure 2 divides into three
categories the courts to which cases were shopped: Delaware, New
York, and all other cities. The historical pattern of forum shopping
exhibits three phases. From 1980 to 1989, the cumulative number of
shopped cases split almost evenly between New York with thirteen
(46.4%) and all other cites with fifteen (53.6%). From 1990 to 1993,
the shopped cases split almost evenly between Delaware and New
York, with a combined total of twenty-eight cases (52.8%), and all
other cities, with twenty-five cases (47.2%). Between Delaware and
39 For example, the greatest number of large Chapter 11 filings occurred in 1991.
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New York, Delaware led slightly with fifteen filings to New York's thir-
teen. In the third phase, from 1994 to the present, Delaware has been
the dominant destination for forum shopping with thirty-three cases
(82.5%). New York has had four (10.0%), and all other cities have
had only three (7.5%). Thus, Delaware currently dominates forum
shopping to a degree that New York never has.
FIGuRE 2
NuMBER OF LARGE CHAPTER 11 CASES SHOPPED, BY
SELECrED Disnmcrs: 1980-1997
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B. Decreasing Case-Processing Times, Increasing Prepackaged
Bankruptcies
The increase in forum shopping occurred against a background
of changing case-processing times. Because processing time plays a
role in explaining forum shopping, it is helpful to describe the
processing-time pattern before analyzing forum shopping. This
processing-time pattern is itself complicated by increasing use of
prepackaged bankruptcies, which reduces case-processing time. Fig-
ure 3 shows processing times for unnegotiated bankruptcies, and Fig-
ure 4 then describes the increasing use of prepackaged filings.
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Figure 3 shows, by year, the mean time to confirmation or sale of
assets for all unnegotiated cases.40 The trend, especially since 1989, is
toward faster case processing.41 Delaware has a higher proportion of
recent filings than other courts. Because recent processing times are
faster generally, Delaware might have a faster mean-processing time
even if, at any given time, it processed cases at the same pace as other
courts. 4 2
FIGURE 3
MEAN TIME TO TERMINATION, LARGE CHAPTER 11 CASES BY
YEAR: 1980-1997
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NoTE: The center of each circle indicates the Mean number of days to confirmation; the
area of each circle indicates the relative number of filings in the year.
Figure 4 shows the numbers of prepackaged, prenegotiated, and
unnegotiated filings in each year from 1980 to 1997. Two debtors
filed prepackaged plans in 1986, but the next prepackaged filing did
not take place until November 1990. Since 1992, 28.3% (34 of 120) of
the filings have been prepackaged. Prenegotiated filings have oc-
curred at lower rates. Prenegotiated plans, like prepackaged plans,
40 Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the sale of all or part of a debtor's
assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1) (1994). The study treats a sale of substantially all of the
assets as the functional equivalent of a reorganization.
41 Bermant and Flynn suggest that the trend toward faster processing of Chapter 11
cases extends beyond cases involving large, public companies. See Gordon Bermant & Ed
Flynn, Outcomes of Chapter 11 Cases: U.S. Trustee Database Sheds New Light on Old Questions,
AM. BANK. INsr.J., Feb. 1998, at 8, 32 (reporting a decline in the time interval from filing
to confirmation for Chapter 11 cases of all sizes nationwide).
42 See infra Part IV.B.
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are a recent phenomenon that began at about the same time that
bankruptcy filings shifted to Delaware.
FIGURE 4
NumBER OF LARGE CHAPTR 11 CASES BY YFAR: 1980-1997
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Prepackaged and prenegotiated cases exhibited higher forum-
shopping rates than unnegotiated cases. Among the fifty-eight
prepackaged or prenegotiated cases in the study, thirty-three filings
occurred in bankruptcy courts that did not serve the cities of the debt-
ors' chief executive offices-a forum-shopping rate of 56.9%. Among
the 226 other cases, eighty-nine (39.4%) were filed in a court other
than that serving the city in which the corporation's chief executive
office was located. The difference in shop rates between unnego-
tiated and other cases is significant at the .018 level.43
43 By convention, the hypothesis tested is called the "null hypothesis." See GEORGE W.
SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS § 5.1 (8th ed. 1989). The re-
ported significance level is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true.
That is, the significance levels provide an inverse measure of the likelihood that the differ-
ence in shopping rates between unnegotiated and other cases shows a real relation rather
than mere random variation. The smaller the significance level, the more surprised one
would be to observe the difference if the tested hypothesis (i.e., that no difference exists)
were true. See id. § 5.2, at 65. By arbitrary convention, results that are significant at or
below the .05 level are described as statistically significant. See, e.g., THE EVOLVING ROLE OF
STATISnCAL AssEsSMENTs AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS § A.2, at 196-97 (Stephen E. Fienberg
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All but two of the prepackaged filings in the study, however, were
filed during or after 1990,44 when the overall rate of forum shopping
was considerably higher than during the earlier period. This circum-
stance raises the possibility that shopping rates among prepackaged
cases appear high only because shopping rates were high at the time
of those filings. In fact, the rate of forum shopping for prepackaged
cases has remained higher than the rate for nonprepackaged cases
during the period since 1991. From 1991 to 1997, forum shopping
occurred in thirty-one of fifty-two prepackaged or prenegotiated cases
(59.6%), while shopping occurred in only fifty-one of 111 unnego-
tiated cases (45.9%). Thus, after 1990 the unnegotiated case-shop-
ping rate was lower than the prepackaged and prenegotiated case-
shopping rate. The difference, however, is significant only at the .131
level.45 For this period, consequently, one cannot reject the hypothe-
sis that prepackaged or prenegotiated cases are no more likely to be
shopped than other cases.
Figure 5 explores the relation between the rise in prepackaged
cases and the rise in forum shopping. It shows the changes over time
in the forum-shopping rates for prepackaged and prenegotiated cases
and for unnegotiated cases. The figure charts filings beginning with
1991 because only a few prepackaged filings occurred prior to 1991.
The figure shows that the rate of forum shopping has increased for
both kinds of cases over time. That is, the rates of shopping were
higher from 1995 to 1997 than from 1991 to 1993. The principal dif-
ference in the movement of the two rates occurred in 1994 when the
rate for prepackaged or prenegotiated cases rose sharply while the
rate for unnegotiated cases fell. The overall similarity in the magni-
tude and direction of movement of the two rates suggests that similar
causes drive both rates.
IV
EXPLANING FORUM-SHOPPING TRENDs
Several trends in large Chapter 11 cases-the increase in forum
shopping, the increase in Delaware filings, the reduction in case-
processing times, and the increase in prepackaged bankruptcy fil-
ings-have coincided. The coincidence of these trends makes it diffi-
cult to identify separate causes for Delaware's ascension as the forum
of choice. Some scholars have attempted to explain the shift to Dela-
ware as a response to what they perceive as Delaware's greater effi-
ed., 1989). The significance level reported in the text is based on Fisher's exact test. For a
discussion of the benefits of Fisher's exact test over a chi-squared significance test, see
ALAN AGRESTI, ANALYSIS OF ORDINAL CATEGORICAL DATA 11 (1984).
44 See supra Figure 4.
45 This is based on Fisher's exact test. See AGRSnT, supra note 43.
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FIGURE 5
RATE OF FORUM SHOPPING OF LARGE CHAPTER 11 CASES BY
PREPACKAGED STATUS: 1980-1997
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ciency in handling prepackaged bankruptcies or large Chapter 11
cases in general. 46 The true story is in some ways simpler and in other
ways more complex.
Delaware may not have attracted forum shoppers so much as the
changing situation in New York repelled them. Once forum-shopping
debtors began filing in Delaware, more followed. Something about
Delaware attracts forum shoppers, but identifying that something is
not easy. In contrast to explanations of the Delaware Bar and some
academics, this study finds no robust evidence in the pattern of filings
or processing times that suggests Delaware offers a more efficient fo-
rum for resolving large Chapter 11 cases, whether or not they are
prepackaged.
A. The Shift from New York to Delaware
Figure 2 shows that New York was the principal destination for
big-case forum shopping through the 1980s. Two events in 1988 ap-
46 See, e.g, Skeel, supra note 8, at 28 (stating that "Delaware has successfully addressed
the single biggest problem with Chapter 11 in recent years-the inordinate time and ex-
pense of the reorganization process"); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Im-
proving Corporate Bankruptcy Law Through Venue Reform 23-26 (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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pear to have contributed to the shift to Delaware. Despite the exis-
tence of a random draw in the bankruptcy clerk's office, large New
York bankruptcy reorganizations in the early 1980s tended to gravitate
to Bankruptcy Judge Burton R. Lifland. 47 Debtors may have viewed
an assignment to Judge Lifland as desirable both because he had
more experience than any other judge in bankruptcy reorganizations
of large, public companies and because he had a reputation for being
pro-debtor and pro-reorganization. 48 In January 1988, the New York
court changed its random assignment system so that the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts in Washington would generate
the random element.49
In that same year, Judge Helen S. Balick, the only bankruptcy
judge in the District of Delaware, ruled that a corporation's "residence
or domicile" for venue purposes was at its place of incorporaion.50
The decision might have encouraged large, corporate debtors to file
47 LoPucki and Whitford's data show thatJudge Lifland adjudicated seven of the 13
New York cases in their study. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 31 n.66. Our
investigation shows that he in fact signed the confirmation orders in eight of the 13. The
number ofjudges in the New York bankruptcy court at the time of the draw of these cases
averaged between four and five. This number derives from the judges' terms in office, as
furnished to us by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. The probability of one
judge drawing seven or more of 13 cases in a random draw among five judges is about .007.
The probability of one judge drawing eight or more of 13 cases in a random draw among
five judges is about .001. The probabilities of such concentrations of cases (seven of 13 or
eight of 13) occurring in a random draw among four judges are about .024 and .006,
respectively. From 1980 through 1987, Judge Lifland adjudicated nine of 18 large cases.
The probability of such a draw among five judges is about .004. The probability of such a
draw among four judges is about .019. The probabilities would be larger if one tests the
hypothesis that any judge, not justJudge Lifland, would have drawn so many cases.
Recusals, variation in the number of active judges, and the need to account for reas-
signed cases make these calculations inappropriate for questioning the randomness of ini-
tial case assignments. The important point for the purposes of this Article is that the cases
tended to gravitate to one judge and that this circumstance was probably widely known
among the big-case bankruptcy lawyers. See Amy Dockser, ChiefJudge, Veteran of Big Cases,
Gets Airline's Chapter 11 Petition, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1989, at AIO.
48 See Lawrence A. Weiss & Karen H. Wruck, Information Problems, Conflicts of Interest,
and Asset Stripping- Chapter i1 's Failure in the Case of Eastern Airlines, 48 J. FrN. ECON. 55, 62
(1998); see also Seth Lubove, A Bankrupt's Best Friend, FoRBEs, Apr. 1, 1991, at 99, 102
(charging that "Lifland's pro-debtor reputation is so widespread that companies which
want to stiff their creditors are known to 'forum shop' to get their cases before him"). The
Manhattan office of the bankruptcy court reportedly implemented a computerized ran-
dom assignment system "to avoid any appearance of impropriety." Dockser, supra note 47
(quoting a New York bankruptcy court clerk).
49 See Dockser, supra note 47.
50 See In re Ocean Properties of Del., Inc., 95 B.R 304, 305 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988).
Judge Balick's decision in Ocean Properties rested on earlier authority. See In re Hudson
River Navigation Corp., 59 F.2d 971, 973 (2d Cir. 1932) ("This bankrupt, being a Delaware
corporation, had its residence and domicile in that state."); see also In re Hudik-Ross Co.,
198 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (rejecting an application to transfer away from the
state of domicile), affd, Hackensack Plumbing Supply Co. v. S.O.S. Sheet Metal Co. (In re
S.O.S. Sheet Metal Co.), 297 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1961). That authority, however, was under
earlier statutes.
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in Delaware. Since early in the twentieth century, Delaware had estab-
lished itself as the jurisdiction of choice for the incorporation of large,
public companies.51 Delaware won that status initially by routinizing
the process of incorporation. It continued its dominance by adopting
corporate laws that favor corporate promoters and management and
by providing a competent, experienced judiciary to oversee the appli-
cation of these laws. Thus, providing amenable legal structures for
large, public companies already had become one of Delaware's largest
industries. Eighty-nine percent of the large, public companies that
filed for bankruptcy reorganization from 1980 to 1997 were incorpo-
rated or had a subsidiary that was incorporated in Delaware.52 Judge
Balick's ruling confirmed that Delaware was a proper venue for all
these companies. Under a contrary ruling, Delaware would have been
a proper venue for fewer than 1% of them.53
The shift to Delaware as the preferred destination for big-case
forum shopping began in the last two months of 1990 with the filing
of the United Merchants & Manufacturers and Continental Airlines
cases.54 The proportion of large, public bankruptcy filings that in-
volved forum shopping remained stable at about 40% through 1993,
but Delaware's proportion of filings grew swiftly during that period.
From 1994 to 1996, the proportion of cases involving forum shopping
increased sharply, and Delaware assumed dominance. In 1996, twelve
of fourteen large, public companies that filed for bankruptcy reorgan-
ization (85.7%) did so in Delaware.
51 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
52 Of the 279 10-K filing corporations in this study, 184 (65.9%) were incorporated in
Delaware. Of the remaining 95 corporations, 45 had Delaware corporations in their corpo-
rate group, 29 did not, and this study had incomplete information on the remaining 21.
Thus, of the 258 companies for which data were available, at least 229 (88.8%) were incor-
porated in Delaware or had Delaware corporations in their corporate group.
Having a Delaware corporation in the group is significant because a corporation is
eligible to file in a district in which there is pending a case concerning the corporation's
affiliate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (1994). Using this provision, bankruptcy lawyers have
developed the strategy of first filing the case of an eligible subsidiary in the district, and
then, based on the proper venue thus obtained, filing the case of the parent in the same
district. Examples of the use of this strategy include Eastern Airlines, LT, and Wickes Corpo-
ration. The Eastern Airlines Group filed cases numbered 89B 10448 and 10449 (BRL) on
March 8, 1989, and the LTV group filed cases numbered 86B 11270 through 86B 11334
(BRL) on July 17, 1989, both in the Southern District of New York, Manhattan Division.
The Wickes Companies filed cases numbered LA-82-06657WL through 663WL, 06665WL,
06933WL through 06935WL, and 07139WL through 07144WL on April 24, 1982 in the
Central District of California, Los Angeles Division.
53 Only two of 284 companies in this study (0.7%) were headquartered in Delaware;
probably no additional companies in this study had their principal assets in Delaware.
54 The United Merchants and Manufacturers group filed cases numbered 90-827 to
90-829 on November 2, 1990, and Continental Airlines group filed cases numbered 90-932
to 90-984 on December 3, 1990, both in the District of Delaware.
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The clearest evidence that forum shopping into Delaware had
reached disturbing levels came from ChiefJudge Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
of the Delaware District Court. Effective February 3, 1997, Chief
Judge Farnan took the unprecedented step of withdrawing the auto-
matic reference of Delaware bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy court
and personally taking over the assignment of Chapter 11 case filings
in Delaware. 55 The only reason he gave for doing so-that "a signifi-
cant increase in the number of bankruptcy cases has occurred and
that it is appropriate and necessary that judges of the district court
participate in the handling of such cases"56 -was factually incorrect.
The number of Chapter 11 filings in Delaware actually had decreased
from 242 in 1995 to 209 in 1996,57 the dockets were moving rapidly,
and the bankruptcy judges had not asked for any assistance. 58 More
likely, Judge Farnan's purpose was to reduce concerns regarding the
significant shift of forum shopping to Delaware.5 9
Judge Farnan's order immediately interrupted the filing of big
public cases for more than five months-not just in Delaware but
throughout the entire United States. With the exception of a case
filed in Dallas four days after the effective date, no large, public com-
pany filed for bankruptcy reorganization from the effective date of
Judge Farnan's order untilJuly 7 of that year.60 When filing resumed,
the proportion of cases involving Delaware forum shopping fell to
50%.61 In October 1997, the National Bankruptcy Review Commis-
sion finalized its tentative recommendation to eliminate venue at the
55 See Order Regarding Referral of Title 11 Proceedings to the United States Bank-
ruptcy Judges for this District (Jan. 23, 1997), repinted in BANKR. CT. DECISIONS: WKLY.
NEWS & COMMENT, Feb. 4, 1997, at Al, A8.
56 Id.
57 See NEW GENERATION RESEARCH, INC., THE 1997 BANKRUpTCvYEARBOOK & ALMANAC
17, 21 (Christopher M. McHugh ed., 7th ed. (1997)).
58 Chief Bankruptcy Judge Helen Balick announced her resignation shortly after
Judge Farnan's order. See Judge Balick to Retire, BANKR. Or. DECISIONS: WKLY. NEWS & COM-
MENT, Nov. 18, 1997, at Al. She stated that it was for health reasons and not in response to
Judge Farnan's order. See Morris and Judge Balick Respond to Professors'Forum Shopping Study,
BANKR. CT. DECISIONS: WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, May 12, 1998, at A3, A4; see also Professor
LoPucki Responds to Clerk of Court Cecelia Morris andJudge Balick, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS: WKtLY.
NEws & COMMENT, Nov. 17, 1998, at A3 (responding, point by point, to the May 12, 1998
article).
59 See Skeel, supra note 8, at 34 (suggesting that Judge Farnan "cleverly preempted
federal legislation by, in effect, saying 'we get the message'"). An alternative explanation is
that Delaware was at risk at that time of losing one of its districtjudgeships. Judge Farnan
may have seen the bankruptcy caseload as a possible justification for retaining this
judgeship.
60 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database (last modified 1998) (on file
with authors).
61 From July 1997 to December 1997, 10 large, public companies filed for bankruptcy
reorganization in the United States. Five of those cases forum shopped into Delaware. See
id.
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debtor's place of incorporation. 62 The Commission, incredibly, as-
sured its readers that the recommendation "is not directed at the
bankruptcy courts in the Southern District of NewYork, those in Dela-
ware, or in any other specific bankruptcy venue. '63
The Delaware State Bar Association challenges the existence of a
massive shift of forum shopping to Delaware. The Report of the Dela-
ware State Bar Association to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission in
Support of Maintaining Existing Venue Choices notes that about 80% of
companies incorporated in Delaware file Chapter 11 proceedings in
non-Delaware venues64-arguably an 80% rate of forum shopping out
of Delaware. This argument makes sense only if one accepts the
premise that incorporation in a state is a sufficiently significant tie to
make the state an expected bankruptcy venue from which one should
measure forum shopping. We attach no such significance to place of
incorporation. Instead, we measure forum shopping from the loca-
tion of the company's headquarters. Filing outside the district or city
of headquarters generally indicates that company executives are will-
ing to incur extra trouble and expense. 65 No such implication at-
taches to filing away from the company's place of incorporation. 66
B. Delaware's Comparative Speed in Processing Cases
The argument that Delaware more efficiently processes large
bankruptcies rests heavily on its allegedly faster case-processing time. 67
Differences in case-processing times do influence forum choice.68 If
62 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 35 (recommending section 3.1.5, which
would amend "28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) ... to prohibit corporate debtors from filing for relief
in a district based solely on the debtor's incorporation in the state where that district is
located").
63 Id. at 779.
64 See Delaware Bar Report, supra note 5, at 19.
65 See Skeel, supra note 8, at 36; infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
66 The Delaware Bar's Report, however, does highlight an interesting contrast be-
tween forum shoppers who file in Delaware and shoppers who file in New York. Compa-
nies not incorporated in Delaware rarely file in that state. Only three of 50 cases in
Delaware (6%) were filed by debtors not incorporated in that state. In contrast, 47 of 55
cases in NewYork (85%) were filed by debtors not incorporated in that state. More signifi-
cantly, the Form 10-Ks that 12 of those 55 debtors (22%) filed show no basis for venue in
New York. That is, the debtor is incorporated outside New York, has its headquarters
outside NewYork, and does not list NewYork as one of the places where any member of its
group owns property. Three additional debtors that otherwise would be includable with
the 12 did not provide complete lists of states in which they owned property. It is unclear
whether any of the three owned property in New York at the time they filed. It appears
that cases are more likely to be improperly venued in New York.
67 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
68 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricim, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 114748 (1992) (explaining that litigants seek faster
processing time when choosing between judge and jury trials).
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efficiency attracts debtors, then the shift of forum shopping to Dela-
ware indicates convenience shopping rather than judge shopping.
LoPucki and Whitford have noted that some debtors seek speedy
reorganizations. 69 The direct expenses of reorganization are signifi-
cant and depend in part on case-processing time. 70 The indirect ex-
penses of reorganization-the damage it does to relations with
customers, suppliers, employees, and others-are probably also a
function of the time that Chapter 11 proceedings remain pending. In
general, a quicker reorganization is a less expensive reorganization. If
Delaware offers reliably faster reorganization, this speed could explain
its attractiveness to debtors and creditors.
To explore the relation between case-processing time and forum,
we compare processing times in New York, Delaware, and other lo-
cales. Because processing times are generally shorter after 1989 than
from 1980 to 1988, and because the Delaware court processed only
one case from 1980 to 1988, we limit our comparison to filings after
1989.71
Table 1 shows the number of days that elapsed between the filing
and confirmation for unnegotiated and prepackaged cases filed after
1989.72 The table omits prenegotiated cases because the number of
these cases is too small to generate a meaningful comparison. The
data show meaningful differences in processing time between Dela-
ware and New York. The mean unnegotiated case took 510 days in
69 See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 147
(1990) (discussing companies that pressed to emerge from reorganization to preserve tax
attributes); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 749 n.256 (1993)
(describing companies that pressed to emerge from reorganization so that they could be-
gin making acquisitions).
70 The only empirical study to address the relation between time and cost deals with
ordinary Chapter 7 cases rather than large Chapter 11 cases. See Robert M. Lawless &
Stephen P. Ferris, Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Chapter 7 Business Liquidations, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 1207, 1230-31 (1997) (reporting that time in bankruptcy is a significant
determinant of administrative costs). For evidence about reorganization costs, see Brian L.
Betker, The Administrative Costs of Debt Restructurings: Some Recent Evidence, FIN. MGMTr., Win-
ter 1997, at 56.
71 Table 1 excludes cases pending at the time of this writing. As of this time, all cases
that debtors filed in 1994 and earlier have reached disposition. Three cases that debtors
filed in 1995 remain pending. The Bradlees group filed cases numbered 95 B 42777-42784
(BRL) on June 23, 1995, and Caldor Corporation filed case number 95 B 44080 (JLG) on
September 18, 1995, both in the Southern District of New York, Manhattan Division. Dow
Coming Corporation filed case number 95 20512 on May 15, 1995 in the Eastern District
of Michigan, Bay City Division. Three cases remain pending from 1996, all of which are in
Delaware. We more formally account for the pending status of cases by using censored-
normal regression in Table 2.
72 Table I includes cases leading to a sale of substantially all of a debtor's assets under
§ 363, treating the sale date as the equivalent of a confirmation date, and excludes trans-
ferred cases.
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Delaware and 765 days in New York. The difference in means is signif-
icant at the .053 level.73 Their medians also differ: New York cases
have a median elapsed time of 582 days, and Delaware cases have a
median elapsed time of 463 days. This difference is significant at the
.096 level.74
Table 1 also shows that processing times in Delaware are some-
what faster than processing times in all districts other than New York,
but that the differences are not statistically significant in either the
means or the medians. Statistically, one cannot reject the hypothesis
that there is no difference between elapsed times in Delaware and
non-New York districts. We explore processing-time differences more
rigorously in Table 2, using regression analysis.
TABLE 1
DAYS ELAPSED BETWEEN FILING AND TERMINATION OF LARGE
CHAPTER 11 CASES: CASES FILED AFTER 1989
Significance of
differences among:
All Del. Del. N.Y.
other & & all & all
Del. N.Y. locales N.Y other other
UNNEGOTATED CASES
Number of unnegotiated cases 17 24 76
Unnegotiated case mean days 510 765 620 .053 .230 .172
Unnegotiated case median days 463 582 535 .096 .185 .289
PREPACKAGED CASES
Number of prepackaged cases 19 3 17
Prepackaged case mean days 52 55 59 .786 .397 .858
Prepackaged case median days 38 42 46 .632 .254 .710
NoTE: Prenegotiated cases are omitted because the number of these cases is too small to
generate a meaningful comparison.
Table l's statistics for prepackaged cases in its last three rows
show little evidence for the argument that Delaware more quickly
processes prepackaged cases. The nineteen post-1989 Delaware
prepackaged cases had a mean elapsed time of fifty-two days, in com-
parison to fifty-nine days for the seventeen filings in locales other than
Delaware or New York. The difference in medians between these two
groups is eight days. The other differences across venues are also
small for prepackaged cases, and none are statistically significant. 75
73 The significance level in the text is based on a t-test of the logarithm of elapsed
days. See supra note 43.
74 This significance level is based on a Mann-Whitney test. See H.B. Mann & D.R.
Whitney, On a Test of Whether One of Two Random Variables Is Stochastically Larger Than the
Other, 18 ANNsS MATHEMATICAL STAT. 50 (1947).
75 Table 1 does not include prenegotiated cases. Fifty percent (7 of 14) of prenego-
tiated filings were in Delaware, and after 1989, the figure is 56% (5 of 9). Because
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Differences in districts' case-processing times could result from
differences in the kinds of cases in each district, rather than from dif-
ferences in procedural efficiency. To investigate this possibility, we
model processing time as a function of case characteristics that might
correlate with elapsed time. These characteristics include firm size,
which we measured by assets (log), whether the case was voluntary or
involuntary, and the year of filing.76
Table 2 presents the results of regression models controlling for
these characteristics. The dependent variable in all models is days to
confirmation (log). Dummy variables for New York and Delaware fil-
ings are the explanatory variables of primary interest. The combina-
tion of all other districts serves as the reference category for these two
dummy variables. Table 2 reports unnegotiated cases separately from
prepackaged cases. For unnegotiated cases, Table 2 reports ordinary
least squares ("OLS"), censored-normal, and median regression mod-
els. The median regression model estimates coefficients for presence
of the dependent variable in the fastest half of case-processing times.
A negative coefficient in this model corresponds to greater presence
in the faster half of case-processing times. The OLS and median re-
gression models include only cases that terminated. The censored-
normal regression model includes pending cases and accounts for
their pending status. This technique is preferable for these data be-
cause it avoids the bias that results from excluding pending cases. 77
In all models of unnegotiated cases, the sign of the Delaware
dummy variable is negative, which means that Delaware filings corre-
late with faster case-processing times. The coefficient, however, is al-
ways statistically insignificant. In the censored-normal regression
model that includes the largest sample, the Delaware coefficient is far
from significant (p = .290). Additionally, even this model's coefficient
of-. 144 may overstate any Delaware effect. If Delaware attracts masses
of cases from other districts because of processing speed, it should
have a faster median processing time. The median regression model,
prenegotiated cases proceed much more quickly than unnegotiated cases and because they
are a much larger percentage of Delaware filings than of other districts' filings, one should
account for them separately and not include them with unnegotiated cases. The relevant
comparison is how quickly different courts process similar cases.
76 We also have run models that include variables for the number of corporations
filing a consolidated proceeding and the number of states in which a filing corporation
operates. These variables might provide added measures of complexity that could affect
processing time. Models that included these variables, however, did not improve on the
models in Table 2.
77 See G.S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN
ECONOMTmRCS §§ 6.1-.16 (Econometric Soc'y Pub. No. 3, 1983). For the median regres-
sion model, standard errors are calculated using bootstrap resampling with 200 replica-
tions. See generally BRADLEY EFRON & ROBERT J. TiBSHIRANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
BOOTSTRAP (1993) (discussing the statistical methodology of the bootstrap). For the OLS
model, significance levels are based on robust standard errors.
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TABLE 2
REGRESSION MODELS OF CASE-PROCESSING TiME:
LARGE CHAPTER 11 CASES
(Dependent variable is days (log) to confirmation or sale)
Unnegotiated cases Prepackaged cases
Censored Median
normal OLS regression OLS OLS
Delaware filing -. 144 -. 175 -. 049 -. 197 -. 194
New York filing .235* .223* .264** -. 474* -. 103
Assets (log) .193*** .189*** .162** -. 055 .054
Year of filing -. 041** -. 050*** -. 051*** .008 .026
Voluntary filing .185 153 .118 - -
Constant 87.500*** 104.592*** 107.147*** -11.679 -49.093
n 198 188 188 33 40
Adjusted or pseudo RF .152 .278 .174 .000 .000
*p<.05 ** p <.01 ***p< .001
NOTE: The first prepackaged case model includes the number of related corporations filing and
the number of states in which the firms operate. Coefficients for these variables are not
reported here. One or both of these variables is missing in seven cases. Hence the second
prepackaged case model has more observations (40) than the first model has (33). Negative
coefficients on the "Delaware filing" and "New York filing" dummy variables correspond with
faster case processing times than the reference category, which consists of all cases filed in
districts other than New York or Delaware.
however, yields a coefficient for Delaware of only -.049, which is essen-
tially zero and utterly insignificant (p = .776). Together, these models
provide no basis for rejecting the hypothesis that Delaware does not
differ from other states in case-processing time. 78
In all models of unnegotiated cases, the sign of the New York
dummy variable is positive, indicating that New York filings correlate
with slower case-processing times. This value is statistically significant.
Differences between the Delaware and New York dummy variables are
78 One must be cautious about interpreting the statistical insignificance of the differ-
ence between Delaware and non-Delaware case-processing rates. The power of a statistical
test is the likelihood of detecting an effect of a specified size at a specified significance
level. If a test is not very powerful, the likelihood of detecting the effect is small. Perfectly
executed studies may fail to reveal socially important differences "simply because the sam-
ple sizes are too small to give the procedure enough power to detect the effect." STANTON
A. GLANTz, PRIMER OF BiosTArIsTIcs 178 (4th ed. 1997). It is important to consider a statis-
tical test's power when one claims that no significant effect has been detected.
A power calculation requires specifying what change in the observed case-processing
time would be socially meaningful. The mean difference between Delaware and other
districts reported in Table 1, 110 days, is not trivial. Having a high probability of detecting
a statistically significant difference of this size between Delaware and other states, however,
requires a much larger population of cases than is available. Thus, one should not take a
failure to detect a significant difference as firm evidence that no such difference exists. On
the other hand, the sample is sufficiently large to yield statistically significant results for
firm size ("assets" in Table 2) and time trend ("year of filing" in Table 2) and New York.
These results suggest that the failure to detect a significant effect for Delaware did not
completely result from sample size.
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also statistically significant. The models of prepackaged cases show
little of interest beyond Table l's summary statistics.
The results of the unnegotiated case models in Table 2 contain
other plausible results. The results confirm the trend in case disposi-
tion time. As Figure 3 suggests, the "year of filing" coefficient is nega-
tive and significant in all unnegotiated case models, indicating that
case-processing times have been decreasing. In addition, the "assets"
coefficient is positive and significant in all models of unnegotiated
cases, indicating that larger firms take longer to reorganize.
The multivariate analysis thus confirms the simpler analysis in Ta-
ble 1. Delaware cases terminate more quickly than cases in other
states, but the effect is not statistically significant except in compari-
son to New York. When case size and the trend toward faster process-
ing times across all districts are taken into account, this analysis also
suggests that New York has slower than normal processing times.
In its report to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, the
Delaware Bar argues that the legal issues involved in cases, rather than
the forum in which the filings occur, frequently determine case dura-
tion.79 As its primary example, the Delaware Bar notes that "asbestos
and mass tort cases have taken many years to resolve not only in New
York, but in Florida, Illinois, and Virginia as well."80 It concludes that
"there is no rational basis for concluding that cases will be shorter if
they cannot be filed in the Southern District of NewYork."81 The data
from our study indicate that part of the Delaware Bar's factual prem-
ise is correct. The eight cases in this study involving asbestos or other
mass torts averaged 4.2 years in duration, 82 considerably longer than
the 1.7 year average for all of the cases in the study. The Delaware
Bar's conclusion, however, does not follow. New York had fifty-five of
the 284 cases in this study (19.4%), but only one of the eight asbestos/
mass tort cases (12.5%).83 If this study excluded the asbestos/mass
tort cases, New York would appear even slower in relation to other
courts.
C. Delaware's Expertise in Prepackaged Bankruptcies
Since 1990, when debtors began filing prepackaged cases in sig-
nificant numbers, Delaware has received a disproportionate share of
these cases. Nineteen of the forty-nine filings in Delaware (38.8%)
79 See Delaware Bar Report, supra note 5, at 11 n.23.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 12.
82 This study includes the Dow Coming case, which currently is pending in Bay City.
For the purpose of the 4.2 year figure in the text, we treat that case as if it concluded in
March 1998.
83 That case, Manville, took 4.3 years, slightly above the average for asbestos/mass tort
cases in the study.
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were prepackaged, while only twenty of the 140 cases in other districts
(14.3%) were prepackaged. This difference is significant beyond the
.001 level.8 4 Bermant noted the "heavy concentration of prepackaged
cases in Delaware," concluding that it "appears to have developed
from a specialization within the local bar and case-management prac-
tices by the court that get the cases off to a fast start."8 5 Other com-
mentators echo Bermant's conclusion that Delaware's concentration
of prepackaged cases indicates that its court has better, more efficient
case processing.8 6
1. The Relation Between Delaware's Rise and Its Treatment of
Prepackaged Cases
Figure 6 casts doubt on the proposition that Delaware first devel-
oped its special expertise in prepackaged cases. It shows that Dela-
ware's large bankruptcy reorganizations in 1990 and 1991 were not
prepackaged and that Delaware did not receive a prepackaged case
until 1992. Thus, Delaware first established its reputation with tradi-
tional cases in 1990 and 1991 and only later attracted a disproportion-
ate share of the increasing number of prepackaged cases.8 7
Moreover, Delaware did not pioneer the use of prepackaged cases.
Debtors had filed prepackaged cases in other districts in 1986, 1990,
and 1991.88
2. Delaware as the Efficient Chapter 11 Forum
Regardless of the timing of Delaware's rise as a shopping venue,
Rasmussen and Thomas, along with Skeel, suggest that allowing con-
tinued shopping to Delaware will maximize social welfare.89 The Del-
aware Bankruptcy Court, they argue, has developed expertise in
handling prepackaged bankruptcies that "allows the managers (with
the cooperation of the majority of creditors) to implement a value-
increasing plan of reorganization quickly and without holdout
84 This significance level is based on Fisher's exact test. See supra note 43.
85 B .mANT ET AL., supra note 7, at 61.
86 See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 46, at 26 (describing the Delaware Court as
specializing in prepackaged bankruptcy, and concluding that " [w ]hile Delaware may have
captured the attention of the bankruptcy bar through its handling of prepackaged bank-
ruptcies, it is now the venue of choice for traditional bankruptcies as well").
87 It is possible that Delaware developed its reputation in prepackaged cases that are
too small for inclusion in this study.
88 In 1986, Oxoco, Inc. filed in Houston, Texas and Crystal Oil fied in Shreveport,
Louisiana. Southland fied in Dallas in 1990. In 1991, JPS Textile Group filed in New
York, Trump Taj Mahal filed in Camden, New Jersey, Edgell Communications/New Cen-
tury filed in Cleveland, Ohio, and Speciality Equipment fied in Rockford, Illinois.
89 See Skeel, supra note 8, at 21-29 (noting the desirable effects of Delaware corporate
law); Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 46, at 23-26.
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FIGuRE 6
USE OF PREPACKAGED CASES IN DELAWARE: 1990-1997
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problems from rent-seeking dissenting creditors."9 0 Perceiving that
Delaware cases are faster and assuming that prepackaged bankrupt-
cies benefit both debtors and their creditors, Rasmussen and Thomas
conclude that disabling Delaware from specializing in prepackaged
bankruptcies without permitting any other court to assume a similarly
dominant position would cause "a decrease in social welfare."91
Although one cannot evaluate Skeel's or Rasmussen and Thomas's so-
cial welfare claim directly,92 two key factual assumptions are
questionable.
First, these commentators assume that the Delaware Bankruptcy
Court handles prepackaged cases more quickly and with greater cer-
tainty of outcome than other courts. The data, however, provide thin
support for their assumption. Of the forty-one prepackaged cases in
our study, nineteen proceeded in Delaware, and the other twenty-two
proceeded in eighteen different cities. Courts confirmed plans in all
forty-one cases; thus there was no difference in this measure of suc-
cess. Table 1 shows that the average number of days in Chapter 11
was fifty-two for the Delaware prepackaged cases and fifty-nine for
cases in other cities. The median time in Chapter 11 was thirty-eight
90 Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 46, at 23; see also Skeel, supra note 8, at 31-33
(discussing Delaware's judicial expertise in bankruptcy).
91 Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 46, at 25-26.
92 For some difficulties that attend ultimate social welfare claims about the reorgani-
zation process, see Theodore Eisenberg, Baseline Problems in Assessing Chapter 11, 43 U. To-
RONTO LJ. 633, 655-56 (1993).
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days in Delaware and forty-six days in other cities. Neither of these
differences approaches statistical significance, either in the univariate
analysis in Table 1 or in the multivariate analysis in Table 2. Although
Delaware processed cases more quickly than courts in other cities, the
time difference is small enough to qualify as immaterial. Indeed, after
controlling for year of filing and case size, the large negative sign on
the New York dummy variable in Table 2's first prepackaged case
model suggests that prepackaged cases may even proceed more
quickly in New York than in Delaware.
Second, Rasmussen and Thomas assume that confirming a
prepackaged plan is always in the interests of both the debtor and its
creditors.93 This assumption is also questionable. Disclosures to the
voters may not have been adequate or accurate; proper voting proce-
dures may not have been followed; a plan may contain provisions that
violate public policy. A bankruptcy court that fails to consider these
objections may betray notjust the dissenting creditors but the majority
as well. Delaware is not efficient if it attracts prepackaged reorganiza-
tion cases by assuring a confirmation so quick that dissenting creditors
or United States Trustees cannot participate effectively. Again, the
larger point is that one must understand the reasons for forum shop-
ping to determine whether it improves or impairs the bankruptcy
system.
Other commentators argue that forum shoppers select Delaware
because its bankruptcy court has adopted better case-processing pro-
cedures and more efficient methods of administration. 94 Frequently
cited Delaware procedures include "[o]mnibus hearing dates" sched-
uled months in advance so out-of-town lawyers can plan their travel,95
procedures for scheduling emergency hearings, 96 remote access to
case information and dockets through what may be the most complete
and best functioning PACER site in the nation,97 and controversial
procedures by which local counsel for a debtor who has not yet filed
93 Bermant declined to make this assumption. See BERMANT Er AL., supra note 7, at 40
("We have presented evidence that prepackaged [cases] are confirmed more quickly, but
cannot comment on any negative outcomes that may have accrued to these debtors, their
creditors, or other parties-in-interest.").
94 See, e.g., DJ. Baker, Reflections on Delaware Bankruptcy Practice: Thoughts of an Immi-
gran DEL. Lmw., Fall 1997, at 14, 16 (describing the Delaware Bankruptcy Court as "user
friendly" and quoting an out-of-state practitioner as saying that "[o]n a procedural basis,
everything in Delaware is designed for the convenience of all of the parties and partici-
pants, including both debtors and creditors" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
95 Mark D. Collins, Why Delaware?, DEL. LAw., Fall 1997, at 38, 40.
96 See id.
97 PACER is a system that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts operates in
conjunction with local bankruptcy courts. PACER makes case, party, and docket informa-
tion available on-line to subscribers. The statement in the text derives from the authors'
experience in using dozens of bankruptcy courts' PACER sites over a period of two years.
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in Delaware can have the case assigned to a judge and schedule first-
day hearings for the prescheduled filing date.98
Although these conveniences undoubtedly make a lawyer's job
easier, it is hard to believe that they could counterbalance the expense
of traveling to Delaware and the required retention, in every case, of
local counsel. 99 Preliminary results from a separate survey of debtor's
counsel in the study's cases indicate that debtors retain both remote
and local counsel in nearly every Delaware case but only in a small
minority of New York cases.100 The decision to file in Delaware rather
than New York is, for all practical purposes, the decision to incur the
expense of another law firm's fee.' 0 '
D. More Complete Explanations of Forum Shopping
For the reasons described above, we doubt that Delaware's effi-
ciency or expertise drove Chapter 11 debtors to file in Delaware.
Other considerations cast further doubt on this explanation.
1. The Inadequacy of Processing-Speed Explanations of Forum
Shopping
Table 2's statistical analysis suggests that New York is significantly
slower than other districts in processing unnegotiated cases. This re-
sult undermines the conclusion that faster case-processing times in
Delaware prove Delaware's greater efficiency. The underlying prem-
ise-that fast is efficient-would suggest that New York's case process-
98 See BERmANr E7 AL., supra note 7, at 40-41.
99 The local rules of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware
provide that the U.S. District Court Rules for the District of Delaware apply in bankruptcy
proceedings except when they are inconsistent with bankruptcy legislation. See D. DEL.
BAIcR. CT. LR Order #9 (1999). The U.S. District Court Rules for the District of Delaware
provide that local counsel is required. SeeD. DEL. LR 83.5(d) (1999) (providing that "[a]n
attorney not admitted to practice by the Supreme Court of Delaware may not be admitted
pro hac vice.. . unless associated with an attorney who is a member of the [Delaware District
Court] Bar... and... maintains an office in the District of Delaware .... .").
100 Debtors proceeding in Delaware retained both local and remote counsel in 56 of
the 58 cases (97%). In the other two cases, the debtors retained the firm of'Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom, which has a Delaware office. Even in those two cases, however, the
estate bore the expense of lawyers in the NewYork and Delaware offices of Skadden, Arps.
By contrast, debtors proceeding in New York retained local counsel in only two of 54 cases
(4%). In 50 of the 54 New York cases, only a single law firm represented the debtor.
Generally, the likelihood that debtors would retain local counsel in a city was inversely
correlated to the number of filings in the cities. That is, debtors seldom retained local
counsel in cities that had high filing rates (and presumably a sizeable bankruptcy bar).
Delaware's combination of a high filing rate and a high rate of retention of local counsel is
anomalous.
101 The estate of the debtor pays the fees of local counsel for the debtor. See11U.S.C.
§ 330(a) (1) (1994). If the estate is insolvent, the creditors in some large cases may bear
the impact of the fee. If debtors are incurring additional expense to file in Delaware only
because they externalize that expense, however, their choice to file in Delaware no longer
demonstrates the efficiency of Delaware's bankruptcy process.
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ing was inefficient during the period when New York was the venue of
choice. To endorse forum shoppers' successive choices of both 'New
York and Delaware as efficient, one must conclude that slow case
processing was efficient until 1990, but became inefficient by 1994.
Although one can imagine the possibility of such a cataclysmic shift in
what constitutes efficiency, 10 2 such a shift seems improbable.
A more plausible explanation for the shift is a change in the per-
ception-probably around 1988-that filings in New York had an ex-
cellent chance of being assigned to Judge Lifland. This judge-
oriented explanation is consistent with Delaware's rise because the
rise occurred when only one bankruptcy judge served in Delaware.
One could no longer be so confident in the chances of assignment to
Judge Lifland in New York, but one could be sure of assignment to
Judge Balick in Delaware. Given the pattern of case assignments in
New York, one would expect the shift in perception regarding New
York case assignments to have occurred at about the same time as the
shift in forum shopping to Delaware.
This judge-oriented explanation also is consistent with the sys-
tem's embarrassed reactions to the forum shopping.10 3 It is unlikely
that such drastic measures and reform proposals would have resulted
if observers believed that New York and then Delaware were preferred
simply because they were more efficient.
2. Flight from Source Districts as an Explanation
Explanations of the forum-shopping pattern tend to focus solely
on the characteristics of the selected court while ignoring the charac-
teristics of the rejected courts. But forum shopping does not result
solely from the attractiveness of the destination court. Forum shop-
ping always involves a choice among courts. The home forum usually
has the advantage of physical proximity to the debtor's senior manag-
ment. Debtors from other jurisdictions will not go to the trouble of
filing in Delaware or New York unless these districts provide benefits
the home districts lack.
To explore the source-district side of the forum-shopping equa-
tion, we examine the rate of shopping from each jurisdiction that con-
tained the chief executive office of six or more of the debtors in the
study. The first column of Table 3 lists those jurisdictions. The sec-
ond column shows the number of cases in which the debtor's head-
102 For example, one might hypothesize that aside from expenses of administration,
slow case processing is more efficient than fast case processing. Prior to the shift from New
York to Delaware, expenses of administration were too low to offset New York's advantage;
but a sudden, sharp increase in expenses of administration made fast case processing with
lower expenses of administration competitive. The authors are unaware of any evidence to
support such a hypothesis.
103 See supra notes 47-49, 55-63 and accompanying text.
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quarters was within the geographical territory of that court.10 4 The
third column shows the number of cases that shopped out of the city,
and the fourth column converts that number to a percentage. The
fifth column shows the significance level of the difference between
the shopping rate for that city and the shopping rate for the combina-
tion of all other cities. The sixth column indicates the significance
level when one excludes New York from the comparison group. The
fifth and sixth columns indicate the likelihood that so great a differ-
ence between the rate of shopping from the particular city and the
rate of shopping from all cities would occur by chance in samples of
the sizes observed. 10 5 The table includes tests with and without New
York because of New York's large number of cases and because of its
extreme rate of case retention. This additional testing assures that the
observed effects are not simply a consequence of New York's
inclusion.
The note to Table 3 reports the significance of the intercity dif-
ferences as a whole. With and without New York, significant city-level
effects exist. Table 3 suggests that most cities with six or more poten-
tial large Chapter 11 filings have extreme shopping rates. Either a
surprisingly large percentage of cases leave or a surprisingly large
number stay. Only Chicago has a rate that approximates the average
rate for all cities. Table 3's results suggest that characteristics of the
home courts, rather than simply the attractiveness of Delaware or New
York, have affected the level of forum-shopping rates.
The relationship between case-processing times and shopping
rates for particular cities is relevant to the claim that forum shoppers
seek greater efficiency by filing in jurisdictions with faster case-
processing times. If Skeel, Rasmussen, and Thomas are correct in stat-
ing that speedy case-processing times attract forum shoppers to Dela-
ware, then home courts that process cases the slowest should have the
highest rates of debtors seeking other venues. Once again, however,
the data belie a processing-time explanation: slow case-processing
times do not correlate with high outbound shopping rates. In Table
3, for example, three of the five cities with outbound shopping rates
below 50%-Houston, New York, and Phoenix-have case-processing
times that are slower than the national median, whether one includes
the shopped-out cases in the calculation or considers only the non-
shopped cases. Furthermore, Dallas, the city with the largest number
104 For this purpose, we treated each city in which cases are heard as a "court." Many
federal districts contain more than one court city.
105 To illustrate, the .023 significance level for shopping out of Bridgeport indicates
that a difference in shopping rates as large as that observed between Bridgeport cases and
non-Bridgeport cases would be a chance occurence about 2% of the time if eight cases
were drawn randomly from the non-Bridgeport cases. That is, a difference of this magni-
tude would occur in only about one of 50 draws. See supra note 43.
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TABLE 3
FORUM -SHOPPING BY SOURCE CmTY
Number
Number shopping
Source city of cases out
Bridgeport 8 7
Santa Ana 6 5
Boston 10 7
Newark 10 6
Dallas 24 14
Chicago 10 5
Houston 12 4
Los Angeles 19 5
Denver 10 2
Phoenix 6 1
New York 28 3
All other 141 63
Percent
shopping
out
88%
83%
70%
60%
58%
50%
33%
26%
20%
17%
11%
45%
Significance level of city's
shopping rate
Compared Compared to
to other all cities
cities excluding N.Y.
.023 .027
.088 .100
.105 .195
.336 .521
.133 .283
.749 .999
.564 .391
.154 .093
.196 .111
.242 .240
.000
NoTE: The significance of the shopping-out rate differences across all cities with six or more
cases is less than .001. The significance across all such cities excluding New York equals .016.
of outbound-shopped cases, has processing times that undermine the
processing-speed explanation. Twelve of the fourteen cases forum-
shopped from Dallas went to New York or Delaware even though Dal-
las's median and mean processing times (496 and 516 days, respec-
tively) are either faster than, or not noticeably different from, the
processing times in New York and Delaware that Table 1 reports. 10 6
Regression analysis confirms that case-processing times are not signifi-
cantly lower in shopped cases.' 0 7
The data do not allow complete analysis of the source-district fac-
tors. Both repulsion and attraction, however, are at work. Reform
that fails to account for both of these features will fail to address im-
portant causes of forum shopping.
E. Transfer's Inadequacy as a Venue Correction Mechanism
The court to which a case is shopped has discretion to transfer
the case to a more appropriate venue "in the interest ofjustice or for
the convenience of the parties."' 08 The Delaware Bar Association has
argued that transfer effectively counters shopping into Delaware. 10 9
106 The Dallas median and mean processing times, like those in Table 1, are based on
unnegotiated, completed cases that were not transferred.
107 We modeled case-processing time, in part, as a function of whether a case had been
shopped.
108 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (1994).
109 See Delaware Bar Report, supra note 5, at 17 & n.38.
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The data, however, do not support its argument. Transfer is rare
in voluntary cases, 110 though common in involuntary cases. As Table
4 shows, courts transferred only five voluntary cases."' Two of the
transfers were from Delaware and the other three were from Los An-
geles, Atlanta, and Pittsburgh. 112 In comparison, Table 4 shows that
courts transferred eight involuntary cases. Three transfers were from
New York, the other five were from Denver, Newark, Dallas, Houston,
and San Antonio." 3 Thus, venue changes occurred in only about 5%
of the cases that debtors shopped, but in 62% of the cases that credi-
tors shopped. This difference is statistically significant beyond the
.00001 level. These findings regarding voluntary and involuntary
transfer are consistent with those of LoPucki and Whitford." 4
A low transfer rate may result from few requests for transfer, a low
rate of granting transfer requests, or a combination of the two. The
Delaware Bar Association reports that Delaware's bankruptcy court
granted eighteen of twenty-seven transfer motions from 1988 to
1996,1-5 suggesting that a low rate of requests for transfer is the domi-
nant cause.
LoPucki and Whitford speculated that the low rate of requests for
transfer had resulted from a combination of factors." 6 Because credi-
tors' committees are appointed in the forum court, are comprised of
creditors willing to serve at that location, and are likely to retain coun-
110 Transfer is rare in the mass of civil litigation as well. See Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CoRNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511
(1995) (quoting a study that indicates that transfers occurred in "slightly more than 1%" of
civil cases). There is no suggestion, however, that forum shopping occurs in the mass of
civil litigation with anywhere near the frequency in which it occurs in large, public bank-
ruptcy reorganization.
111 The failure of courts to transfer voluntary cases is nowhere more evident than in
New York. Debtors filing in New York, which covers Manhattan and the Bronx, seldom
have their operations there. Under our protocols, the case would be "shopped" only if the
company's headquarters were outside New York. Only three of the 26 voluntary cases
shopped to New York were incorporated there. Thus, for most of the 23 cases not trans-
ferred, there was no substantial basis for venue in New York.
112 Not all of the transfers were "corrections" of forum shopping according to the defi-
nitions employed in this study. For example, the Pittsburgh court transferred the Wheeling
Pittsburgh case to Erie, Pennsylvania even though the debtor's headquarters was in
Pittsburgh.
113 Again, transfer does not always mean correction according to our definitions. For
example, the Denver court transferred the Daisy Systems case to San Jose even though the
debtor's headquarters was in Denver at the time of filing.
114 Among the 37 voluntary cases that LoPucki and Whifford studied, only two transfer
motions were made and both were denied. Interestingly, they attributed the difference
between transfer rates in voluntary and involuntary cases to the fact that debtors actively
seek transfer and that involuntary cases do not "grow roots" in the period before the court
can hear a venue motion. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 26 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
115 See Delaware Bar Report, supra note 5, at 17.
116 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 24-26.
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TABLE 4
TRANSFERS OF SHOPPED CASES
Voluntary cases Involuntary cases
Shops into Cases Transfer Shops into Cases Transfer
Court this court transferred rate this court transferred rate
Wilmington 47 2 4% 1 0 0%
New York 26 0 0% 4 3 75%
All other cities 34 3 8% 8 5 63%
Total-All courts 107 5 5% 13 8 62%
sel at that location, creditors' committees are unlikely to seek venue
correction." 7 Rarely are other parties sufficiently interested to move
for transfer.118 One possible reform would create incentives and op-
portunities to challenge venue on a case-by-case basis. For such a
scheme to work in voluntary cases, however, it would have to work
quickly. The first few days of a large Chapter 11 case are hectic, as
thousands of parties seek representation in the initial forum and as
the court considers emergency motions on a variety of matters. Thus,
any transfer after that period may be counterproductive. 119 That
venue correction proceeds reasonably well in involuntary cases does
not suggest an easy solution to the problem of correction in voluntary
cases. Involuntary cases do not grow roots nearly so quickly because
the court does not appoint committees and the reorganization pro-
cess does not begin until the court rules on the merits of the petition.
This characteristic of involuntary cases typically allows the court a few
months in which to address the issue of venue-months that are not
available in voluntary cases. In addition, the debtor often has the
incentive to resist the creditors' choice of an inconvenient forum.
CONCLUSION
The data establish New York as the primary destination for forum
shoppers in the 1980s. Around 1990, the destination shifted abruptly
to Delaware. The benign reasons offered for forum shopping-effi-
ciency and convenience-do not find support in the data. Efficiency
based arguments fail to explain New York's initial popularity because
New York is a slow case-processing district. Moreover, there is no evi-
117 See id. at 24.
118 For an illustration of the effect of creditor incentives on reorganization confirma-
tion rates, see Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 11? The
Evidence from Japan, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 111, 137 (1994) (showing large creditors are more
likely to oppose confirmation).
119 See, e.g., In re Vienna Park Properties, 128 B.R 373, 377 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(denying the transfer of a Chapter 11 case filed in what was admittedly the wrong venue
because the court had "gained such a familiarity with, and insight into, this case, that a
transfer of venue would only thwart the efficient administration of the case and work an
injustice in the case and to all parties involved").
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dence that cases shopped conclude significantly faster than cases filed
in the debtors' home districts. Efficiency explanations remain un-
proven as a basis for Delaware's current popularity.
Convenience, the principal reason why many legislatures give
plaintiffs a choice of venue, is also not a plausible explanation for
Chapter 11 forum shopping. In every debtor-initiated case involving
forum shopping, the debtor's executives decided to file in a city other
than their home city. The abrupt shift in the principal destination of
forum shopping from New York to Delaware also undermines a con-
venience-based explanation. Prior to the shift, some had argued that
forum shoppers filed in New York for the convenience of prominent
New York lawyers who would have been the debtor's choice of counsel
regardless of venue. Given that those same lawyers are now riding the
Metroliner from New York to Wilmington, the convenience argument
seems implausible.
Explanations of the forum-shopping pattern as a form of judge
shopping, on the other hand, are consistent with New York's and Del-
aware's popularity. The message of this forum-shopping pattern is
troubling. Although bankruptcy law and procedure are uniform
throughout the United States, the perception that case processing is
different across cities induces forum shopping. Thus, the system's
worst fears about the reasons for shopping are likely correct: debtors
shopped to New York and now shop to Delaware in large part to se-
cure particular judges or to avoid judges in their home districts.
Forum shopping of big-case bankruptcies has become a political
issue. In June 1996, the Federal Judicial Council's Committee on the
Administration of the Bankruptcy System commissioned the Federal
Judicial Center to study forum shopping. In its 1997 report to Con-
gress, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 120 recommended
venue reform that effectively would close the Delaware Bankruptcy
Court to large, publicly held companies. 121
Closing Delaware, the most visible manifestation of the
nonuniformity that breeds forum shopping, would provide the system
with a fig leaf. It arguably would reduce the aggregate level of forum
shopping because no other district has proven to be as attractive as
Delaware and no other district has so many large companies with a
connection that would plausibly make the district an appropriate
place to file. But this study's findings that Chapter 11 forum shopping
is in significant part driven by judge shopping and by source-district
120 Congress established the Commission in 1994 to report about issues and problems
relating to the Bankruptcy Code. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,
§§ 602-603, 108 Stat. 4106, 4147.
121 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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conditions suggest that, even without Delaware, forum shopping
would continue.
To the extent that forum shopping responds to problems with
home fora, reducing the level of shopping may exacerbate those
problems. Assume, for example, that one or more judges in a district
enter unduly restrictive first-day orders, 122 making it difficult to reor-
ganize in the district. If debtors' lawyers respond by filing their cases
in another district, the problem largely dissipates. If a solution to fo-
rum shopping does not address the underlying problem, some busi-
nesses will fail unnecessarily. The larger point is that curtailing forum
shopping will not produce uniformity; it will leave debtor-friendly
courts and creditor-friendly courts each free to process cases in their
own biased fashion.
122 First-day orders include orders necessary to allow the Chapter 11 debtor to con-
tinue routine operations. See, e.g., 4 WILuiAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRi'PT L-\w
AND PRACnCE § 85:6 (2d ed. 1993).
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